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Abstract—We consider the problem of secure communications
in a Gaussian two-way relay network where two nodes exchange
confidential messages only via an untrusted relay. The relay is
assumed to be honest but curious, i.e., an eavesdropper that
conforms to the system rules and applies the intended relaying
scheme. We analyze the achievable secrecy rates by applying
network coding on the physical layer or the network layer
and compare the results in terms of complexity, overhead, and
efficiency. Further, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages
of the respective approaches.
Index Terms—Secure network coding, compute-and-forward,
bidirectional untrusted relay channel
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the world is connected over networks and com-
munications are easily overheard. Protecting the confidentiality
of communication in networks is therefore an important topic.
Based on the assumption that an attacker has access to
a limited number of links only, a network coding scheme
protecting confidentiality was proposed in [1]. However, if the
attacker can observe more links or even nodes, he might be
able to decode the data and, hence, security measures have to
be integrated.
End-to-end encryption of the data on the network layer will
prevent information leakage to an attacker. Despite this basic
method, various approaches for ensuring the confidentiality of
network coding schemes have been proposed [2] that promise
to save costs in comparison to end-to-end encryption.
Another approach to secure data transmission is based on
information theoretic security: Already Shannon studied the
notion of perfect secrecy in his seminal paper [3] for the case
in which an eavesdropper has direct access to the codeword
sent. Almost thirty years later, the theoretical basis for an
information-theoretic approach was laid first by Wyner [4]
and then by Csiszár and Körner [5], who proved in two
seminal papers that codes for channels exist which guarantee
both reliability and a prescribed degree of data confidentiality.
The extension to continuous input and output alphabets was
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developed in [6]. It took more than another twenty years before
transceiver structures are available to support these wiretap
setups. Extensive analysis and designs have been conducted,
parts of their results are reported in [7], [8], [9] and recent
tutorial papers [10], [11].
In contrast to traditional wireless communication structures
where one receiver focuses on the detection and decoding of
one transmit signal treating interfering signals as noise, in
physical layer network coding [12], the receiver exploits the
interference as a useful part of the signal, e.g., in a linear
combination of two or more transmit signals. It has been
early observed that decoding a linear combination of source
messages at one node does not automatically allow this node to
decode each message individually [13]. Compute-and-forward
network coding together with strong physical-layer security
based on universal hash functions has been investigated in
[14]. Kashyap et al. provided an achievable power-rate region
with perfect secrecy in [15], where they applied compute-and-
forward to the Gaussian two-way relay channel.
Within this paper, we compare approaches on the physical
and network layer and discuss advantages and disadvantages
of these approaches. We focus on the achievable secrecy rates
but discuss also complexity, overhead, and efficiency.
A. Notation
Let log+(x) , max{0, log(x)}. We denote by x′ the trans-
pose of vector x and by Fq the field of size q. A d-dimensional
lattice Λ ⊂ Rd is an algebraic group under addition with
generator matrix G ∈ Rd×d, i.e., Λ = {Gz : z ∈ Zd}. A
lattice quantizer is a mapping QΛ : Rd → Λ that maps a
point x to the nearest lattice point in Euclidean distance, i.e.,
QΛ(x) = arg minλ∈Λ ‖x−λ‖. Let the modulo operation with
respect to the lattice Λ be defined as [x] mod Λ = x−QΛ(x).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We investigate the two-way relay-channel with half-duplex
nodes as depicted in Figure 1. The links are additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels with fading coefficients g1
and g2. Each node has an average transmit power constraint
E‖s‖2 ≤ P . Nodes 1 and 2 have messages for each other but
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Figure 1. Two-Way Relay-Channel.
have no direct connection. They transmit messages with the
help of a relay in two phases. The relay applies compute-and-
forward (CF) [16]. In the first phase the channel is a multiple
access channel (MAC), i.e., the relay receives a superposition
of both signals from nodes 1 and 2 and tries to decode a linear
combination of the original messages. In the second phase, we
have a broadcast channel (BC), i.e., the linear combination is
encoded with a capacity achieving code and sent to both nodes
simultaneously.
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Figure 2. Two-Way Relay-Channel modeled as butterfly network.
Equivalently, the two-way relay-channel in Figure 1 can be
modeled as a butterfly network with a single virtual source
node as depicted in Figure 2. In order to model the source
nodes from the two-way relay channel, the two source nodes
1 and 2 are fed by the virtual source node S over links of
infinite capacity. Both source nodes send their signals over the
channels g1 and g2 to the relay, which corresponds to the MAC
phase in the two-way relay-channel. In order to model the
knowledge of the own sent message at the destination nodes
1 and 2, which are in the case of the two-way relay-channel
identical to the source nodes 1 and 2, we have an infinite
capacity link from source 1 to destination 1 and from source
2 to destination 2. The relay transmits over the channels g1 and
g2 the linear combination of the messages. This corresponds
to the BC phase in the two-way relay-channel.
Remark 1. This butterfly model is more convenient for the
approaches on the network layer than the two-way relay-
channel, as the chosen approaches only support intra-flow
communication, which originates from a single source node.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER
A. Transmission Scheme
We consider compute-and-forward at the relay as introduced
in [16]. Thereby, each message is encoded using a nested
lattice code [12], [17], [18].
In the first phase, the relay receives the signal
yr = g1s1 + g2s2 + zr, (1)
where g1, g2 are the fading coefficients, s1, s2 are the signal
vectors sent by the source nodes, and zr ∼ N(0, Id) is additive
white Gaussian noise. Using the compute-and-forward frame-
work, the relay can decode an equation or linear combination
of the original lattice points,
v = [a1s1 + a2s2] mod Λ, (2)
for some coefficients (a1, a2) ∈ Z2.
Remark 2. Aside from the coefficient vectors a = (1, 0) and
a = (0, 1), the relay can obtain the single messages if the
transmission rates are low enough to be able to decode several
linear independent linear combinations.
The decoding is successful, if the transmission rates of the
source nodes are below the computation rate [16, Th. 2]
RCF = max
a
1
2
log+2
((
‖a‖2 − (g
′a)2P
1 + P‖g‖2
)−1)
, (3)
where g = (g1, g2)′ and a = (a1, a2)′. The relay encodes v
with a capacity achieving code and transmits the codeword
to destination nodes 1 and 2 simultaneously. Both destination
nodes can decode the linear combination sent by the relay,
subtract their own messages and get the message sent by the
other source node or pass the decoded linear combination to
higher layers.
Proposition 1 (Achievable Rate Region). The achievable
rate region for the two-way relay channel with compute-and-
forward is given by
R1 ≤ RCF , R2 ≤ RCF , (4)
where R1 and R2 are the transmission rates of nodes 1 and
2, respectively.
Remark 3. The resulting rate region combines the constraints
from both phases and is given by
R1 ≤ min
{
RCF ,
1
2 log2(1 + Pg
2
1),
1
2 log2(1 + Pg
2
2)
}
, (5)
R2 ≤ min
{
RCF ,
1
2 log2(1 + Pg
2
1),
1
2 log2(1 + Pg
2
2)
}
. (6)
We can remove the min-function because the computation rate
will not be larger than the single user rates. Otherwise, it would
contradict the definition of the capacity of the point-to-point
channel. The proof of the computation rate and the achievable
rate region can be found in [16].
B. Secrecy
In practice, it happens often that a transmission between
two nodes has to use a relay that cannot be trusted. Therefore,
the messages have to be encoded at the transmitter such that
the relay cannot decode the messages separately. Assuming
that the relay is an honest but curious eavesdropper, we use a
compute-and-forward based approach to secure the messages,
which was introduced in [19]. Nodes 1 and 2 use nested lattice
codes with a course lattice Λ, a binning lattice ΛB , and a fine
lattice ΛF , which build a chain Λ ⊂ ΛB ⊂ ΛF . Due to the
additional binning lattice ΛB , this procedure corresponds to
a common binning strategy [9] with the lattice points in ΛB
defining the bins. Points in ΛF are added randomly to confuse
the eavesdropper, i.e., the relay, and provide the required
secrecy. This results in the following achievable secrecy rate
region.
Proposition 2 (Achievable Secrecy Rate Region [19, Th. 1]).
Consider a two-way relay-channel with fading coefficients g1
and g2 which are grouped to a vector g = (g1, g2)′. Each
node has an average transmit power constraint E‖s‖2 ≤ P
and the noise at each node is assumed to be i.i.d. normally
distributed, N(0, Id). Then an achievable secrecy rate region
is given by
R1 +R2 ≤ 2RCF − 12 log2(1 + Pg
2
1 + Pg
2
2) (7)
where
RCF = max
a1 6=0
a2 6=0
1
2
log+2
((
‖a‖2 − (g
′a)2P
1 + P‖g‖2
)−1)
. (8)
The proof can be found in [19].
IV. NETWORK LAYER
A. Basic Assumptions
In addition to the previously presented secure compute-and-
forward scheme on the physical layer, we want to take a look
on available alternative approaches on the network layer.
A practical implementation of network coding (Practical
Network Coding, PNC) on the network layer has been intro-
duced by Chou et al. in [20]. PNC bases on Random Linear
Network Coding (RLNC) [21], i.e., forwarding nodes ran-
domly select the coefficients for computing the combined data
packets. In the following we summarize only the parameters
that have to be considered for the comparison. For a more
detailed description of PNC, we refer to [20].
The source node splits data to be sent into packets xi
of m symbols xi,j ∈ Fq , amends each packet by a global
encoding vector (GEV) to allow for a decentralized solution,
and organizes the packets into matrices called generations.
A generation comprises h data packets; only packets of one
and the same generation can be combined during network
coding (intra-session network coding). The GEV consists of
h symbols βi,j ∈ Fq . Hence, the data packets to be sent have
the following structure:
xi = (βi,1, βi,2, ..., βi,h, xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,m).
B. Approaches for Enforcing Confidentiality
To ensure confidentiality of the data to be sent, the attacker
must not be able to decode the original data. This goal can
be achieved by end-to-end encryption of the data to be sent.
However, methods tailored to network coding can require less
encryption and decryption effort. An overview on various
approaches for securing network coding against eavesdroppers
can be found in [2]. Within this article, we focus on approaches
that utilize cryptographic primitives. The cryptographic meth-
ods proposed so far either suggest to protect the GEV or to
apply a simple and cost-effective operation to the data packets
before sending them. For our comparison, we selected the
two following approaches, as these approaches do not require
the packets to be decoded at the relay. Therefore, CF can be
applied on the physical layer.
Ensuring confidentiality by encrypting the encoding coeffi-
cients, which are randomly selected by the source node (locked
coefficients), was proposed in [24]. Additionally, the packets
are amended by a further GEV, which functions in the normal
network coding manner (unlocked coefficients). The destina-
tion nodes decode the packets using the unlocked coefficients,
decrypt the locked coefficients, and decode the data packets
by means of the decrypted coefficients. The security of this
protocol named SPOC (Secure Practical Network Coding) was
investigated in [22].
Instead of protecting the GEV, permuting all symbols of the
data packets before sending them (P-Coding) was suggested
in [23]). The permutation only changes the sequence of the
symbols, so that the forwarding nodes can compute linear
combinations as usual. After applying the inverse permutation,
the destination nodes can decode the data.
V. COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES
A. Assumptions
There are various issues that complicate a comparison of
approaches working at physical layer and network layer. At
physical layer, transmission rates and channel uses are impor-
tant parameters. Data processing at higher layers is usually
not considered. At network layer, we are talking about the
transmission of data packets of a certain size. We assume that
the lower layers ensure the transmission of the sequences of
bytes over the insecure channels (physical layer is a “bit-
pipe”). Even if we focus on one layer, processing at the
other layers is necessary. Further, more aspects have to be
considered for a fair comparison, e.g., the type of achieved
security and computational complexity.
Consequently, the comparison of approaches working at
these different layers is not at all straightforward. As a starting
point, we evaluate the overhead implied by the different
approaches, i.e., the possible relative payload.
For the calculation of the payload, we do not consider the
GEV for the network layer approaches since we can assume
the coefficients βi,j to be 1 in case of the butterfly network.
Please note that the encrypted GEV is part of the data packets
for SPOC, i.e., it reduces the payload per packet.
For similar reasons, we neglect the payload caused by the
distribution of the CF coefficients a for the approach on the
physical layer.
B. Payload of Network Layer Schemes
The payload per data packet depends on the symbol size
q, on the packet size n, and on the generation size h. For
both approaches, it is not necessary to increase the symbol
size so that we assume q = 28 according to [20]. Since we
do not consider the GEV, SPOC achieves an absolute payload
of Labs = n − h dld qe8 and a relative payload of L =
Labs
n per
packet. In contrast, P-Coding provides an absolute payload of
Labs = n and therefore a relative payload of L = nn = 1.
SPOC assumes encryption of the originally chosen GEV by
means of a symmetric encryption scheme such as AES. If we
consider only the encryption of the encoding coefficients, the
length of these coefficients would be determined by the block
length l of the cipher. To avoid this effect, we assume that the
first l bytes of the data packet are encrypted.
To allow for a comparison to physical layer approaches that
consider the transmission rate per channel use, we evaluate
the relative payload for transmitting a certain amount of
information (B bytes). Structuring the data into packets and
generations causes additional overhead if the data to be sent
is not a multiple of the payload per generation. The ratio of
information size to transmitted data size can be computed by
r =
B⌈⌈
B
Labs
⌉
h
⌉
nh
, (9)
where r ∈ [0, 1].
C. Secrecy Rate
We define the achievable secrecy rate Rs [bit/cu] as the
amount of information bits that can be securely transmitted
within a channel use. We focus on the achievable sum rate,
i.e., the rate of the virtual node S in Figure 2.
On the physical layer, the achievable secrecy sum rate is
given by Proposition 2, i.e.,
RPHYs = 2RCF − 12 log2(1 + Pg
2
1 + Pg
2
2). (10)
The network layer depends on the reliable transmission on
the physical layer. Therefore, the achievable secrecy sum
rate is the ratio r of information to transmitted data times
the achievable rate on the physical layer without secrecy
(Proposition 1), i.e.,
RNETs = 2rRCF . (11)
Since the ratio r of information size to transmitted data size
goes to one as the packet size n goes to infinity, it is obvious
that the achievable secrecy sum rate on the network layer will
asymptotically approach 2RCF , i.e., the CF sum rate. Note that
this is only true if the information size is large with respect to
the packet size. Otherwise, the packets will not be fully filled
which results in a large overhead.
For the simulations, we assume the butterfly network as
introduced in Sec. II (Figure 2) with a multicast capacity of
h = 2. Hence, generations for network layer approaches
contain h = 2 data packets.
As an example, we choose a symmetric scenario where the
channel parameters are g = (12, 12)′ and the transmit power
for all nodes is P = 1 Watt. Please note that we normalized the
power to noise ratio to one and put the scaling in the channel
coefficients. This scenario corresponds to a more realistic
parameter set of, e.g., g = (0.8, 0.8)′, P/σ2 = 23.52 dB,
where σ2 is the noise power which is assumed as 1 Watt
throughout this paper.
On the physical layer, we get the following computation
rate by choosing the coefficients a of the linear combination
as a = (1, 1)′,
RCF = 3.5875 bit/cu. (12)
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Figure 3. Achievable rate regions with different transmission schemes on the
physical layer for channel coefficients g = (12, 12)′ and P = 1 Watt.
With this computation rate, we can achieve a secrecy rate of
RPHYs = 3.0875 bit/cu. (13)
The achievable rate regions with the capacity region of the
multiple access channel for comparison is given in Figure 3.
In Figure 4, the achievable secrecy sum rates for the pre-
sented approaches on the physical layer and the network layer
are plotted over the packet size n for an information size of
B = 100000 bytes. The secrecy sum rates for SPOC and P-
Coding are calculated according to (11). Because the relative
payload of the P-Coding approach is 1, it achieves a secrecy
sum rate of 2RCF even for small packet sizes unlike the SPOC
approach. For large packet sizes, not all packets will be filled
completely and the achievable rate will decrease. This effect
can be seen in more detail for an information size of B = 100
bytes in Figure 5, where the network layer schemes achieve
the full secrecy sum rate of 2RCF only for n = {2, 10, 50}.
Such an effect might be seen in sensor networks where the
amount of transmit data is small whereas a behavior like in
Figure 4 will more likely occur in streaming applications with
full buffers.
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D. Differences on the Layers
In this section, we want to discuss some problems that
occur when trying to compare physical layer secrecy schemes
to network layer confidentiality schemes. We do not aim to
answer the question which approach is better. Instead we want
to point out some things that need to be kept in mind, when
comparing secrecy on different layers.
First of all, the definitions of secrecy differ significantly on
the two layers. On the physical layer we are talking about
information theoretic security, i.e., the secrecy can be mea-
sured quantitatively with regard to the statistical independence
between the messages sent by the transmitter and the received
signal at the eavesdropper. In our system, we have the weak
secrecy criterion, i.e., the information leakage rate to the
eavesdropper goes asymptotically to zero as the block length
goes to infinity.
The information theoretic security of SPOC requires ad-
ditional steps before encoding [22]. The authors showed
that with certain pre-processing steps the mutual information
between the original messages and the transmitted messages
goes to zero as the field size goes to infinity. If the locked
coefficients are sent over the network as suggested in [24],
the security depends on the cryptographic algorithm, i.e., the
whole scheme can be only computational secure. The authors
of [22] assumed that this information is sent over a secret
channel.
P-Coding requires a new permutation key for each genera-
tion to prevent that a key compromise threatens the security of
subsequently sent generations. Further, the encoded messages
should be uniformly distributed which requires an additional
pre-processing.
Both network layer approaches require a key distribution,
which needs to be done securely. On the physical layer, no
secret keys are necessary and therefore no additional commu-
nication overhead occurs. Another advantage of the physical
layer secrecy is the lower computational complexity compared
to the cryptographic operations that are needed on the network
layer. However, these tasks can be done in hardware and are
fast in execution.
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we analyzed network coding under secrecy
constraints in the two-way relay network. We compared dif-
ferent approaches on the physical layer and the network layer
with the main focus on the achievable secrecy rate. We showed
that network coding on the network layer can achieve higher
secrecy rates if the packet size is chosen appropriately. On the
other hand, physical layer network coding provides stronger
secrecy with less computational complexity.
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